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CHAPTER I 
PRELIMINARY VIEW OF PHILOSOPHERS DISCUSSED 
The question of free will has been called by Herr Du Bois-
'4"', 
Reymond, a modern materialist and evolutionist, a riddle which 
ill ever remain insol~ble.l Science, he felt, had no answer for 
However, he recognized the indisputable fact of free will • 
.. 
nlike Du Bois-Reymond there are many later evolutionists who 
avoid the riddle by denying free will, or by proposing an evasive 
solution which in name maintains freedom bJlt in fact is only a 
80ft determinism. 
From among these evolutionary philosopher. we have selec-
ted three for discussion in this thesis, Engels, Ward and Sellars 
ederick Engels is one of those who dismisses the problem by 
denying free will. James Ward proposes a teleological view which 
... 
lapses into a soft determinism. Roy Wood Sellars finds no place 
in his naturalistic universe for any traditional view of free 
ill. 
ENGELS 
Frederick Engels, co-founder of Modern Communism and there 
ere important in modern times, presents a strictly materialistic 
concepti&n of all being. 2 Far him matter is the only reality, 
and in terms of matter and its motion the world and all that is 
in it are to be explained. Engels plainly regards his philosophy 
as strictly materialistic and accepts the name that Marx has 
~----------------------------------6~. 
it, Dialectic Materialism. In presenting the doctrine ot glven .. ' 
thiS Communist 8pokesman we are using his work "Herr Eugen Dur-
'hing's Revolution in Science", which is a refutation ot Durhing's 
philOSOphy and at the same time a systematic exposition of the 
dlalectc method and of the Communist w~;ld outlook. Also, we 
will cull from his later work "Ludwig Feuerbach", which is a cri-
ticism not only of the works of Feuerbach but also of the classi-
oal German Philosophy. 
WARD 
The philosophy of James Ward, a Cambridge psycholog~t and 
.etaphysician of distinction, is set forth in his Gifford Lec-
tures published under the title, "The Realm or Ends, or Pluralism 
and Theism".3 The work presents a criticism of pluralism in 
tavor of a theistic interpretation of the wbrld. Ward sets forth 
an 1dealistic philosophy which, to his mind, is grounded on the 
realities of human experience and the sifted findings of the • 
Bc1ences of nature. Departing from the old absolute idealism and 
accepting the panpsychist monadology of Leibnitz, Ward takes as 
his st~rting point the pluralistic outlook; his preference then 
is for the many rather than the one. In like manner he rejects 
the a priori method of the older idealists and through the study 
of effects proceeds to the causes. The picture of reality thus 
presented is completed with the theistic view of the truth of a 
transcendent-immanent God, who is the beginning, becoming and end 
of the many. Ward maintains that such a view is the only one 
that can give a satisfactory meaning to what we know of the world 
7. 
It is rationally justified though it be not empirically verified; 
.' . 
that is, strictly speaking, it is an act of faith. The article 
"Psychology" in the eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Brit-
tanica of which he is the author will also assist much in the 
presentat10n of his doctrine. 
SELLARS 
Roy Wood Sellars, at present a professor at Michigan Uni-
.. 4 versity, calls his philosophy Evolutionary Naturalism. It is a 
modified form of Emergent Evolution as proposed by Lloyd Morgan. 
For the emergents, evolution is a progressive series of stages of 
being in which there supervenes at each new level a new form of 
relatedness to ascending levels. 5 Activity or mind equ~ted with 
God is said by Morgan to be the agency which lifts the world. . 
Sellars accepts the general theory of emergent development but 
rejects the n~tion of God. Nature is the onl¥ explanation re-
quired. Hence, the title, Evolutionary Naturalism. Sellars de. 
fines it as an outlook or attitude toward reality rather than as 
a fixed and dogmatic set of principles. This naturalism, however 
is necessarily materialistic for nature is regarded as a complete I 
and closed system functioning essentially upon the genetic basis 
of the physical world and needing no power or being outside of 
this system. The presentation of Evolutionary Naturalism is to 
be found in a book by Sellars bearing that title. Together with 
that volume another book by Sellars, «The Principles and Problems 
of Philosophy" has been used as the source from which the presen-
tation of Sellar's philosoPhy has been drawn. 
8. 
In this thesis the dootrines of these three will be pro-
posed in three separate chapters with a view to understanding 
clearly just ehat each one holds concerning free will. Thus far 
the treatment will be merely expository and analytic. A similar 
presentation of the traditional Schola~pic doctrine as found in 
the writings of its leaders will be given. The evolutionary doc-
trines will be evaluated then in the light of the Scholastic doc-
trine and their errors and inadequacies·pointed out. 
Notes to ChaEter I 
.' 1. This view was expressed in a leoture before the Berlin 
Aoademy of ~oienoes on July 8, 1880. 
9. 
2. Engels, 1820 - 1895, was the most intimate friend and in-
separable oompanionof Marx. Together they pu~lished a num-
ber of books and artioles on Sooialism. Their inflammatory 
artioles against absolutism oaused their expulsion from 
Franoe. Brussels saw the publioa£ton of the handbook of 
Communism, Manifesto of the Communist Party. This manifesto 
drawn up at the request of the Communist Union, oontains the 
germ of all the leading ideas developed by Marx later on. 
3. Ward, 1843 - 1925, originally studied for the ministry and 
was minister of Emmanual Churoh, Cambridge for one year. 
La~er he devoted himself to psyohologioal researoh, beoame 
fellow of Trinity College in 1875 and university professor 
of mental ph1lGsophy in 1897. He was Gifford leoturer at 
Aberdeen 1895 - 97 and at st. Andrew's in 1908 - 10. Be-
sides the Realmsof Ends other 1mportant works touohing our 
subjeot are Naturalism and Agnost1cism, Psyohological Prin-
oiples, and numerous artioles 1n Mind and in the Br1t1sh 
Journal of Psychology. 
4. Roy Wood Sellars is a member of the new school known as 
Cr1tioal Reali.m, Thi. new school resembles olosely the 
sohool of Engl1sh New Real1sm. Sellars was one of the con-
tr1butors to the volume, Essays 1n Critical Realism. 
5. O. Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution, p. 35. 
10. 
CHAPTER II 
.' 
ENGELS AND DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM 
Dialectical Materialism is the title given by Karl Marx to 
the system of philosophy on which the Communistic revolution is 
~ 
based. In defining the two terms Marx said that the dialectic is 
the theory of the changes, conflicts and resolutions which we ob-
serve and which men in the past have obierved going on in the wo 
world. The meaning of materialism is clear for it simply means 
that all reality is explained solely in terms of matter to the 
exclusion of every immaterial being and concept. 
Marx calls his philosophy inverted Hegelianism. He claims 
to have set the philosophy of Hegel on its feet. The inversion 
came about in the following manner. Hegel maintained that real-
ity is the working out of the Absolute in the process of theSiS, 
antithesis and synthesis. In this way the Absolute.as present· 
in the driving force behind the developing world. Marx main-
tained that there was only the world present and this world was 
developing into the Absolute. Engels states the position thus: 
, "Hegel's dialectics is selfdevelpment of the concept. 
The absolute concept does not only exsist - where un-
known - from eternity, it is alao the actual living 
soul of the whole exsisting world. This ideological 
reversal had to be dane away with. We comprehended 
the concepts in our heads once more materialistically 
as images of real things instead of regarding the real 
things as images of this or £.hat stage or development 
or the absolute concept. Thus dialectics reduced it-
self to the science or the general laws of motion -
both of external world and of human thought.- two sets 
of laws which are identical in subatance but differ in 
their expression in so far aa the human mind can apply 
them consciously, while in nature and also up to now 
for the most part in human history, these laws aS8'ert 
themselves unconscioualy in the forms of external ne-
cessity in the midst of an endless series of seeming 
accidents. Thereby the dialectic of the concept it-
self becp-me merely the conscious reflex of the dial-
extical motion of the real world and the dialectic of 
Hegel was placed upon its head, or rather turned off 
its head on waieh it waB stand~~g before, and placed 
upon its feet again. ---- The great basic thought 
that the world is not to be comprehended as a com-
plex of ready-mad things, but as a complex of pro-
cesses, in which the things apparently stable no--
less than their images in our he~ds, the concepts, 
go through an uninterrupted chante of coming into 
being and passing away, in which, in spite of all 
seeming accidents and of all temporary retrogeession, 
a progressive development asserts itself' in the end -
this fundamental thought has, expecially since the 
time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated consciousness 
that in this generality it is scarcely ever contra-
dicted." 1. 
11~ 
Reality viewed from this standpoint demands no final s01-
utions and eternal truths. For true ~nd false become only rela-
tive terms. Motion is at the bottom of everything, and only when 
acknowledging this motion can we view reality as it is. .Because 
of this continuous tide of change all constancy in nature, and 
therefore every basis for absolute metaphysics, is destroyed. By 
thus inverting the Hegelian process, the materialists attempted 
to make matter in motion the sole basis of all reality. All 
notions of spiritual forces were rejected as unnecessary, as 
having no foundation in reality. 
Communist Way to Freedom 
The history of the world shows us that the path of this 
development will be revolutionary, but in the end will lead to 
a perfect Communistic world in whieh all class. distinctions have 
l 
12. 
een eradicated and the forces of production are controlled by 
and not by the capitalist. Under such conditions the 
will be relieved of all anxiety over the means of sub-
istence. In this state there can be, for the first time, mean-
ng in our talk of real human freedom aad of an exsistence in har 
with the established laws of nature. 2 
The only freedom considered by Engels is this external 
• 
reedom which is nothing more than economic freedom based on com-
ity of ownership. This mignt also be taken as his definition 
freedom. 
Is man a free agent in bringing himself to this millenium 
freedom? Marx who is of one mind with Engels would say no. 
his 'Critique of Political Economy' we find a fUller answer. 
e says: 
"It is not the consoious mind or man that determines the 
form or-nis being, but, vice versa, the social form of 
his being that determines the conscious action of his • 
mind. " 
hus the nature and content of the Capitalist consciousness is 
quite different from that of labor. The material conditions of 
each class are the determinanats of both their physical and men-
tal action. And as the material condit1ons of each class d1ffer, 
so the determinants. of their phvsical and mental action d1ffer. 
us there 1s one set of pr1nciples and ends for the capitalist, 
another for the laborer; exploitation of the laborer dictated by 
greed and lust for power, for the first; hatred of the capitalist 
and the overthrow or the system by revolution, for the second. 
13. 
These principles and ends, we note once more, are not the' result 
of the choice of the individuals making up the classes but are 
the necessary result of the laws of nature working themselves out 
under the peculiar economic conditions of the present stage of 
the world's development. The individual is not a free being but 
merely a cell in the organism ot his own class. Thus the environ 
ment in which the cell finds itself determines its actions; and 
, . ' 
while the individual may seem to act freely, yet his actions are 
determined from within by inner-connections peculiar to the class 
and unknown to him. 3 
Necessity in the Class 
In like manner the class itself is pictured as being de-
termined by these two factors, 1) the laws of nature operating 
the same way thDoughout the whole of nature, and 2) the peculiar 
economic conditions surrounding the class. Engels considers thdt 
this is a valid conclUsion from the history of the world up to 
his day. For the diversity of philosophies, religions, customs, 
codes of law and the other fruits of men's theorizing reflect the I 
world's development in the minds of men. And the diversity is 
due to ignorance of the real inter-connections beneath the pro-
cess of development and the supplying of other inter-connections 
4 in their place. These various inter,retatlons,ot phenomena con-
tain a grain ot truth but, die to 19norance, are for the most 
part false. Just what the grain of truth is which is to be found 
in these systems, Engels does not say. However, from his dis-
14. 
cuss ion of the question of morality we might conclude th4't those 
elements of the different philosophies which SUppOl't the rise of 
the proletabiat contain this grain of truth. 
Economic Conditions Determine Morality 
From the fact that the different classes of society have 
their special morality Engels concludes that men consciously or 
nconsciously derive their moral ideas trom the practical rel-
ations on which their class position is based; in other words 
their morality is a system based on the economic relations in 
which they carryon productionaand exchange. 5 To the obJection 
that there is much in common between the codes of morality of the 
capitalist class and laboring class Engels responds that the com-
mon element in these codes is due 'solely to the fact that these 
different classes represent stages of the same historical devel-
6 
opment having a common historical background. Not one of thes~ 
codes is the true one in the sense that it has absolute validity_ 
That morality which, in the present, represents the overthrow of 
the present, represents the future, and contains the maximum of 
7 durable elements. And that morality is the proletariat. The 
good life, consequently, is the one in which the individual, act-
ing in accordance with the laws of nature, helps to promote the 
process of historical evolution. And since this process means 
the rise of the prolebariat and the destruction of the capitalist 
class, the furthering of the cause of the proletariat becomes a 
sort of norm of morality. 
15 • 
Forces of Historical Development . ' 
In speaking of these various driving forces behind the fo 
ward moveaent of the world Engels acclaims these three great dis-
coveries which present a starting pOint, for the demonstration of 
the interconnection between the processes in nature in particular 
spheres as well as between these various spheres themselves. The 
first is the discovery of the cell as tA unit from Whose multi-
plication and differentiation the whole organism of plant and 
animal body develops. This relation is applied to the individual 
in saying that the relation of the individual to the c18,ss is the 
same as that of the cell to the organism. The second discovery 
is the transformation of energy which has demonstrated that all 
the so-called forces operative in the first instance in inorganic 
matter are different forms of manifestation of universal motion. 
This is a justification of materialism. The third is the dis- ,,. 
coyery of narwin that the stock of organic products of nature 
surrounding us today, including mankind, is the result of a long' 
process of evolution from a tew original unicellular germs. With I 
the aid of these discoveries it is possible to present in an ap-
proximately systematic form a comprehensive view of the intercon-
nections in nature by means of the facts provided by empirical 
nature 1tself. 8 
Engels, following Hegel, now indicates the forces which in 
the present economic conditions are behind the process of world 
development. The motive force of historical development presents 
16. 
itself in the form of evil, each new advance necessarily-'appear,. 
ing as a sacrilege against things hallowed, as a rebellion 
age,inst conditions which, however old and morib\md, have still 
been sanctified by custom. Since the emergence of class distinc-
tions it has been precisely the wicked 'passions of man - greed 
and lust for pwoer - which serve as the levers of historical de-
velopment. The history of feudalism and of the bourgeosie is a 
.. 
9 
single proof. 
Engels does not stop with the ganeralization given above 
but goes further and show. in just what the good life consists. 
The utge to happiness is innate in man and therefore must farm 
the basis of all morals. Happiness, then, is the end to be sough. 
in life, and what makes me happy is good, unhappy, evil. ~~e 
basic laws of Feuerbach's morality, rational self-restraint with 
regard to ourselves end love in out intercourse with others are 
rejected by Engels as tenuous and superficial. Preoccupation 
with the outside world rather than Vii th ourselves is the way to 
happiness. The urge to happiness thrives only to a trivial ex-
tent on ideal rights. The material means to happiness are by far 
the greater source of this happiness. Engels gives some of these 
means; - "Means of subsistence, an individual of the opposite sex 
books, conversation, argument, activities, articles for use and 
working up". 10 
The morality of Feuerbach based on mutual love and con-
sideration is rejected for the second reason that it is cut ex-
17. 
. 11 
aotly to the pattern of modern capitalistic society. ~tua1 
love? The~e oan be no love between the oapitalist and the labor-
er for ~hetr classes are opposed to one another. Furthermore, 
greed and lust for power are the levers of historical development 
'4'", 
under presnedt conditions; and in order to fubther this process 
and thus p~omote the cause of the proletariat we ~ follow the 
course whieh these evil passions dictate~ Engels acknowledges 
the presenee of ecil and seems to regret it for he says that the 
present evtl will bring about the future good. And that future 
good, as has already been mentioned, is the elfmination of all 
classes from society, and the placing of the productive powers in 
the hands of the people. The f1nal resutl will be the poss1bil-
ity of leading one's life in accord with so-called established 
laws of nature. Such a life of eoonomic freedom is the only free 
life. 
What we have seen so far makes up the general setting in 
which the indiv1dual is placed. Man finds himself in a olosed 
system of whiCh he 1s a very insignificant part. Just as the 
life of the brute and every inanimate oreature is beyond doubt 
neoessitated in every respeot by the laws of nature, so is the 
life of each human being. Human nature is dist1ngui~ed from the 
others by this one feature that its conformity is not blind but 
consoious and intelligent. In this conscious conformity to the 
laws of evolving history, and in it alone, oonsists man's free-
dom, as we shall now prooeed to show in Engel's own words. 
18. 
"To him ( Hegel ) freedom is the appreciation of4 ne-
cessity. 'Necessity is blind only in so far as it is 
not understood'. Freedom does not consist in the 
dream of independence of natural law~, but in the know-
ledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives 
of systematically making them work towards definite 
ends. This holds good in relation both to the laws of 
external nature and to those w~ch govern the bodily 
and mental life of men themselves - two classes of 
laws which we can separate from each other at most on-
ly in thought but not in reality. Freedom of the will 
therefore means nothing but the capacity to make de-
cisions with real knowledge of the sUbject. Therefore 
the freer a man's judgment is i~ relation to a def.1-
nite question, with so much the greater necessity is 
the content of this judgment determined; while the 
uncertainty, founded on ignorance, which seems to 
make an arbitrary choice among many different and 
conflicting possibilities, shows by this precisely 
that it is not free, that it is controlled by the 
. very object that it should control itself. Free-
dom therefore consists in the control over ourselves 
and over external nature which is founded on knowledge 
of natural necessity; it is therefore a product of his-
torical development." 12. 
Internal Freedom 
The question of internal freedom apparently never entere~ 
the mind of Engels. Of course were he to consider it his opin-
ion would be that such a power was incompatible with the mater-
ialistic explanation of human nature which the Communist main-
tains. Human nature and human behavior will some day be complete 
ly explained in terms of scientif1c laws. At present our l1mited 
knowledge of these laws does no~ permit of such an explanat10n. 
All that we can say 'at present is that the will 1s determined by 
deliberat10n and passion. l3 Man w1lls what he does, but his will 
is governed and controlled by the laws of his nature. 
According to this view, then, the object of the will is 
the economic good. For the individual it means the mate~ial 
means to life. And this good is ordained for a still higher 
good, the economic independence of the human race, the goal of 
Communism. 
19. 
'4"", 
In the mind of ~gels the goal is quite definite and cer-
tain of attainment. It is the end towards whiCh the human race 
progresses. Engels attempts to acoountfor the apparent freedom 
.. 
in human actions by saying that ignorance of men retards the pro-
gress of the race. However, this ignorance does not and cannot 
change the course of th1s progress. For the same reason of ex-
plaining away human, freedom he says that man's influence at times 
seems to effect what seem to be fortuitous events. Similarly, 
men do not succeed in fulfilling their intentions. The results 
of their actions either fall short of or exceed the desired end. 
However, under all of these events there work inexorably, to the 
.+ 
final end, the inner hidden laws which govern and control all 
events. 
SUmriJarl 
Free will, then, has no place in the Communist outlook. 
Man is a cog in the class machine, nothing more, nothing less. 
The forces of historical development which move and determine the 
class are the ultimate springs and determinants of individual 
human activity. The ends and aims of the class are the enly ends 
and aims of the individual whether he know it or not. The indi-
vidual is inSignificant, the class is the all-important thing in 
20. 
history and life. It is therefore an illusion to say th~t man i8 
free, either as a person or as a member of socie~y. His efforts, 
consciously posited, are actually functions of the unknown inner-
processes which he unwittingly serves. His freedom does not can-
...... , 
slst in personal autonomy, freedom of selfdetermination, but 
rather in the power to know the inner laws which govern him and 
to act in accordance with them. His frjedom is economic liberty. 
a.nd the glory of man is t·o help the cause of the world revolution 
and make possible the real freedom of those happy individuals who 
shall witness its triumph. 
21 • 
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OHAPTER III 
WARD AND PANPSYOHISM 
.' 
Our first exposition dealt with Dialectic Materialism 
22. 
which, as we saw, denied the existence of free will. From this 
'., 
materialistic philosophy we now turn to James Ward's panp~ychis­
tic interpretation of reality in which we shall find the author's 
answer to Du BOis-Reymond's great riddll. 
"All individual things are anumated, albei t in diver.se de-
grees. Everything has in itself a striving to preserve its own 
condition and improve itself.tt These are the words of Spinoza 
and they are accepted by Ward as fundamentally correct, though 
primitive •. Such a view is fundamental because it takes account 
of both factors of experience and because, while it is impossible 
from the standpoint of nature to reach spirit, it is only from 
the standpoint of spirit that nature can be under.tood: in a word 
the universe is taken to be spiritual - a realm of ends. 
From this standpoint Ward interpretes the 8onstitution of 
I the world strictly in terms of mind. Every existent being has a I 
oumenal side and phenomenal side, a body and a soul. Through 
the process of creative enolution or 'epigenesis' the lowest 
eing has gradually developed from stage to stage until the high-
est being, man, was attained. The lowest being, in striving afte 
ends, gradually developed through conflict and cooperation with 
other beings. At' the human level, man, by communicating with 
other human beings, achieves his own creative synthesis in the 
23. 
characteristic qualities of self-consciousness ano. ratio~ality.2 
In this highest creature we find the striving for ends ever going 
on until the perfection of the realm of ends will be attained. 
This ideal term of the creative series is that perfect harmony 
..... 
"in the consummation of a perl'ect commonwealth, wherein all co-
operate and none conflict, wherein the many have become one, one 
realm of ends.,,3 
• 
Moreover, this perfection of the human race is identified 
with God who is rear4ed as the beginning, becoming and end of 
4 this perfect harmony. God is not a being remaining aloof from 
the world and creatures but is with these creatures, immanently 
present in the advance toward the creative synthesis. God's re-
lation to creatures is not to be compared to that of the potter 
to the clay but rather to the begetting of life by life. This is 
a brief sketch of the realm of ends and will suffice as a back-
ground for our study of Ward's doctrine on human freedom 
Freedom in the Universe 
Ward finds room in his universe for freedom and presents 
arguments in its defence; but it is noteworthy that he does not 
limit freedom to conscious beings only. Unlike Engels, who main-
tains that all creatures are determined by the ~aws of nature, 
Ward maintains that there is freedom even in the lowest forms of 
being. The spontanebus action of these beings is not determined 
by laws but rather by the ends which are the object of their 
~triving. The soul, or the entelechy of the body, is not limited 
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to definite functions, but is capable of almost limitles~'variety 
The end pursued prompts the function, and the function in turn 
develops and determines the structure. In maying this Ward at-
tempts to explain specific activities in terms of final and ef-
.. , ficient causes only and thus would do away with anything like a 
determining form innate in the being. In this way the genesis of 
the higbe~ range of beings is explained • 
.. 
Ward presents his exposition of free will by means of con-
trast. In the first place, he contrasts self-determination with 
echanical determination, efficient and final causation with 
echanical uniformity, the historcal viewpoint with that of 
science - in a word, 'the realm of ends' with 'the realm of 
nature'. In the second place, in truly Kanbian fashion, he con-
trasts the noumenal with the phenomenal, and distinguishes the 
standpoint of the subject from that of the object. 
First contrast 
Determination, Ward points out, does not always mean the 
same thing. The traveler, to use his own example, is determined I 
to continue his journey though the wind be strong and the way 
dusty. Also, the dust is determined to its movement by the wind. 
"In the first case determination implies efficient 
causation, self-determination and purpose; it 
does not imply any uniformity such that in all 
like circumstances a like determination has always 
occurred and always will. In the second case on 
the other hand this is preCisely what is implied; 
whereas nothing is implies as to efficient caus-
ation; also self-determination and purpose are 
either denied or treated as meaningless." 5 
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Mechanical causation, devoid of purpose and efficiency, tctgether 
with the necessity that follows frOm it are onl]a methodological 
postulate set down by the scientists. They are unjustifi ed in 
making this postulate a tested statement of th~mndamental 
.. ., 
nature of the universe and in attempting on thilground to prove 
the unreality of eff1 cient and purposive cauS8. tion. 
In the same way the term 'direction' 1s fmbiguous and 
.. 
needs to be c~ar1fied. Direotion in the physicelworld is purely 
spatial and is absolutely determinate; directio~1n the human 
realm, on the other hand, represents oontrol, guidance and a re-' 
lation of wills. Science presents us wi th a rellllll of meohanioal 
neoessi tyj void of individuality, novelty, Cl'ea.tion and guidance. 
History, on the other hand, is a report of i:nd11'idual initiative 
and of the occurrence, through freedom, of new dievements and 
conquests. 
Rebuttal to Determinism 
To the determinists', claim that the SflJDe aetermination is 
found in both orders, motives moving the will a.sphysioal foroes 
move a body, Ward answers. 
"Forces, though distinct, combine theil'effeots 
only because they converge on one bOdy;motives, 
though distinct, confliot only becau.se they di-
verge, so to say, from one subjeot. Tbeforces, 
that is, are applied to the body, the rDOt1ves 
spring from the subj ect. The body JnovE911n the 
one path whlch the forces collectively aetermine, 
the subject moves in the one path wh1c1:l1t seleo-
tively determines. The magnitude of tneforoe is 
referred to an objective standard", thE9strength 
of a motive depends on its subjecti'9'e ~orth; the 
suffioient reason is in the one case mechanioal 
6 in the other it is teleological." 
Relation of Motives to Choice 
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.' 
With regard to the relation of motives to choice, Ward 
believes that both indeterminists and qeterminists make the mis-
.. , 
take of thinking of motives apart from the self. Hence the in-
determinist sometimes feels compeiled to assert that the self 
decides without a motive - an assertion-flagrantly untrue to ex-
perience - while the determinist declares that the action of the 
self in necessarily determined by the strongest motive and is 
therefore not free. The truth is that the self does decide in 
the direction of the strongest ~otive. l~is, however, in no 
wise involves a denial of freedom. As Ward conceives it, the 
determination of the self by its nature is identical with self-
determination, since the nature is one with the self.7 ~urther-
more, such dete~nation does not imply the necessity of any ... 
single act at a given time, for the self is never so fixed and 
limited in its nature that only one act is possible. Thus, the 
self may be said to determine its act, yet man is also free 
since determination and causation do not, in the human realm, 
imply either necessity or uniformity. The distinction, then, 
between freedom and necessity becomes the difference between 
variety in the individual's activity, on the one hand, and uni-
formity, on the other. 
The following excerpt from his work will make clearer 
Ward's understanding of motives. 
"Appetite and aversion, that is to say, conation~ 
implies something that seeks and shuns, a subject 
that actively strives according as it feels and as 
long as it lives. Psychologists do not ordinarily 
talk of motives save in connection with deliber-
ation, which in strictness is an intellectual 
rather than a conative preocess; but for the pur-
pose of our present discussion it wil~ be conven-
ient, and need not mislead, if we regard movtives 
not as pleas or reasons for acting but as impulses 
or tendencies to action. So· regarded, their charac-
teristic is not, that like external forces they move 
or tend to move the subj ec t, but that they are them-
selves the subject moving or ten6ing to move, or 
more accurately, acting or tending to act." 8 
Second contrast 
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In the seoond contrast, using Lotze's figure of a tapes-
try as an illustration, Ward shows the relation of the phenomen-
al order to the noumenal. 9 The laws of causation of the scien-
tist apply only to relations within the phenomenal order, but 
cannot describe the relation between the phenomenal order and 
the noumenal order. Being independent of the phenomenal order,' 
noumenal causation is not necessitated by it and is therefore 
free. This Kantian explanation is germane to our discussion in 
the application of the subject-object concept to human persons. 
Since the noumenal self is independent of the phenomenal order, 
it is in that self that we are to look for freedom. And this 
freedom consists in the spontaneous, contingent response' capable 
of novelty. However, in any particular act there is a relation 
between the two selves which has a determining influence on the 
so-called free act. But before going into the question of inter 
nal freedom it will be well to consider Ward's analysis of the 
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free act as opposed to the necessary actoof the scientidt and 
the determin~t. 
Analysis of Internal Actions 
We do not experience the volition within us as being 
caused by something other than ouraelves. If pleasurEI and pain 
are verily subjective feeling or affection ( effects ), conation 
is verily subjective activity or effectuation ( cause). A mo-
tive implies both; and feeling and activity, though distinct, 
may both arise together in certain situation. But not even the 
feeling, still less the conation, can be described as caused by 
the situation, for the peculiar character which the sj'tuation 
has is a quality given it by the subject. The subjec1, unlike 
inanimate things, is not indifferent to circumstances, but has 
ends and aims to reali:r;,e; and therefore the subj ect af SUIDeS a 
different attitude towards its environment according liS this 
helps or hinders it in the pursuit of various purposef, which 
conform to no general law save to that of self-conser",'ation and 
betterment. The subject's own character determines tr.~e charac-
ter it gives to objects, and its beha.vior towards thetll is so far 
10 
essentially self-determination. 
To sum all this up in a few words, pleasure, pliLin and co-
nation, viewed as such, are immanent activities of thE~ subject, 
are the subject's response and not the result of some external 
for ce which produces these modifications in the subjec~t. In 
this analysis the question of subjective activity indElpendent of 
external causes has been cons~dered. The further questien of in-
ternal freedom will now be considered. 
The "Realm of Ends", whose contents we have up to now been 
considering, is a metaphysical consideration of the problems 
-, treated and says nothing of the question of internal freedom. 
Ward does, however, give one section to the question of internal 
freedom in his article, "Psychology", in the Encyclopaedia Brit-
.. 
tanica, and it will serve our purpose to quote that sectiOn as he 
gives it. 
statement of the Question 
t'The mention of deliberation brings us to the per-
enial problem of 'the freedom of the will'. But 
to talk of will is to lapse into the confusions of 
the old faculty-psychology. As locke long ago 
urged; 'The question is not proper whether the 
will be free, but whether a man be free.' In the 
absence of restraint from without, when a man does 
what he likes, we say he is'externally free'; but 
he may still be the slave of every momentary im-
pulse, and then it is said that he is not 'inter-
nally' free. The existence and nature of this in-
ternal freedom is the problem. 
Analysis of Freedom 
But if such freedom is held to imply a certain 
sovereignty or autonom, of self over against mo-
mentary 'prepensions and blind desires, there can 
obviously be no question of its existence till 
the level of self-consciousness is reached and 
maxims or principles of action are possible. The 
young cilild, the brute and the imbecile, even 
when they do as the like, have not this freedom, 
though they may be said to act spontaneously. A 
resolutely virtuous man will have more of this 
freedom than the man of good moral disposition 
who often succumbs to temptation; but it, is equal-
ly true that the hardened sinner has more of it 
than one still deterred in his evil way by scrupees 
ot conscience. A man is internall~ tree, then, 4 
whenever the ends he pursues have ~s whole-
hearted approval, whether he say with Milton's 
Satan, 'Evil be thou my good', or with Jesus, 
'Thy will be dane'. But this treedom is always 
within our experience a relative treedom: hence 
at a later time we otten declare that in some 
past act ot choice we were not ourselves, not 
really tree. But what is this true selt more 
than our ideal? Or perhaps we preter to say'. 
that we were tree and could have acted other-
wise; and no doubt we might, it the place ot the 
purely to~mal and abstract concept or selt had 
been occupied by some other puaAe of that empir-
ical selt which Is contInuously but at no one 
moment· completely presented. It must be admit-
ted, then, that ~ychological analysis in this 
case is not only actually impertect, but must 
always remain so - so long, am any rate, as all 
that we discern by reflection is less tha all 
we are. But this admission does not commit us 
to allowing the possible existence of a liberum 
arbitrium indifferentiae, sometimes called 'ab-
solute indeterminIsm f ; for that would seem to 
differ in no respect from absolute chance or 
caprice." 
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Internal freedom, therefore, is nothing more than the absence ot 
inhibition and internal conflict. The essential note of this 
freedom, then, is self-determination independent of external 
force and internal restraint. The peculiar disposition of the 
individual is the actual determinant of the act. The variability 
of conduct, consequently, is never attributed to the will but is 
said to lie in the mutability of the various forces within the 
individual Which at any given moment determine the peculiar dis-
position of the subject. Furthermore, the power of free will is 
actually denied in Ward's rejection of a 'liberum arbitrium in-
differentiae' • 
Ward now takes up the discussion of the rigidly determin-
istic position. 4 
"On the other hand, the rigidly deterministic 
position can only be psychologically justified 
by ignoring the activity of the experiencing sub-
jict altogether. At bottom it treats the analy-
s s of conduct as if it were a dynamical problem 
pure and simple. But motives are never merely so 
many quantitative forces playing upon something 
inert, or interacting entirely by themselves. At 
the level of self-consciousness especially motives 
are reasons and reason itself is a motive. In the 
blind struggle of so-called' self'-regarding' impul-
ses might is the only right; but in the light of 
principles or practical maxims ~ight is the only 
right. This superiority in position of principles 
is only explicable by re~erence to the inhibitory 
power of attention which alone makes deliberation 
poss1ble and 1s essentiall~ voluntary; that is, 
subjectively determined.ut no, 1t may be obje~ 
ted, deliberation in SUch cases is just the result 
of painful experiences of the evil of hasty action, 
and only ensues when this motive is strong enough 
to restrain the impulse that would otherwise pre-
vail. Even if this be granted, it does not prove 
that subject's action is determined for and not 
by him; it merely states the obvious tact that 
prudence and self-control are gradually acquired. 
Authoritative princIples ot action, such as selt-
love and conscience, are no more psychologically 
on a par with appetites and desires than thought 
and reason are on a par with the association of 
ideas." 11. 
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Thus Ward refutes rigid determinism by asserting the 1ntervention 
of the self in human acts. Unfortunately, he does no more than 
assert that attention, principles of action and conscience influ-
ence these acts. Nothing is said of the nature of the power in 
virtue of which the individual is able to control attention, on 
the one hand, and to follow the guidance of principles and con-
science,on the other. Furthermore, 'voluntary', to his m1nd, is 
adequately defined in the term 'self-determination' as opposed 
to determination from without. 
32. 
Summary 
The external freedom which Ward maintains consists in the 
subjeot·s spontaneity in responding to, or Bather following, mo-
tives. The motives, then, do determine the course of aotion, and 
are nothing more than the individual's evaluation of the objeot. 
And sinoe this subjeotive evaluation does not oonst1tute a oon-
.. 
stant element, but is always ohanging', the response whioh it ef-
feots also ohanges. In other words, the variability of our sub-
jeotive state is made to aocount for the notable differenoe in 
our oonduot when we are placed in the same objeotive situations. 
In saying this, Ward avoids the problem of variability, a stum-
bling-block to determinists. In the same way the feeling that we 
could have acted differently on some given oocasion is explained, 
not by our internal freedom, but by our different way of nowre-
garding the situation. While rejeoting meohanioal determinism, 
Ward falls into a form of psyohologioal determinism, for aooor-
ding to his view we oan, from experienoe, conclude only to exter-
nal freedom. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SELLARS AND EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM 
Dialeotio Materialism and Panpsyohism have given us two 
answers to Du BOis-Reymond's riddle. E.yolutionary Naturalism 
will give us a third answer. The interpretation of reality pro-
posed by Sellars is distinguished from Dialeotic Materialism and 
Panpsyohism by its rejeotion of both materialism and vitalism as 
fundamental tenets. Another noteworthy characteristic is the ex-
plicit anti-thelogical and anti-religious bias which, at the 
hands of Sellars, beoomes a vital element of Evolutionary Natur-
alism. 
Emergent Evolution in Nature 
The plan of nature which presents itself to the emergent 
evolutionist is likened to a pyramid of tier-like oonstruction. 
A process of creative organization leads at eaoh stage to the ad-
vent of gradients or levels above. Each new level depended upon 
the energies and conditions of the lower level and wes adjusted 
to this wide-spreading foundation. Matter, itself, was evolved. 
Then came the earth with its waters, its salts and fertile earth, 
and the sun giving it radiant energy. Then, little by little, 
came life reaching upward to more oomplex forms. The story is a 
long one, not oompletely deciphered, for whole chapters are mis-
sing in the records. Slowly life lifted to mind, the human mind 
being the latest and highest to appear. Pre-history bave way to 
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uman history; and society with its fruit, civilization, ~egan to 
ominate the surface of the earth. Something of this sort seems 
o be the unavoidable reading of the facts which science has col-
The advantage of such a reading is that it explains the 
·.7 o~existence in nature today of things so different as minerals 
nd government, the stormy ocean and the human mind which contem-
plates it and sees in it beauty and destruction • 
• 
The evolutionary theses, in other words, would hold that 
things of different orders behave differently and that the laws 
hich formulate thi s behavior are not deducible from one another. 
This conclusion is frequently expressed by saying that the laws 
of nature form a hierarchy in which the different levels are dis-
continuous. This logical, or deductive, continuity, does not 
conflict with the genetic continuity of orders 0# things in 
nature. But it means that there are 'junctures' in nature at 
which critical arrangements occur with the origination of novel 
properties.' Genetic continuity is not smoot~ but mutative, as it 
were. What nature does we must accept. Knowledge is an affair 
of discovery. For this attitude, S. Alexander and Lloyd Morgan, 
two very able English thinkers, have an attractive phrase. We 
must, they say, accept these mutative junctures with 'natural 
Piety,.l 
Evolutionary Naturalism 
Sellars rejects the tradi4itional explanations of evo-
lution, the various f~ms 01 vitalism, final causality, the dif-
36. 
ferent dualistic p~tulates, because they emphasize exte~nal fi-
nality or teleological interaction in nature and refuse to admit 
that the different physical systems, that ls, inorganic matter 
and the different levels of organiC matter from the plant to man, 
~ 
contain thel~ own trends. Furthermore, he says that the "assump-
tion underlying these different explantaions has no justification 
for the theory of originative evolution, For this reason he 
calls his own p~ition Evolutionary Naturalism. " But juat ~hat 
precisely is meant by that title as contrasted with the rejected 
theories is not made sufficiently clear. The best characteriz-
ation of Sellar's naturalism is Ward's creative evolution minus 
its spiritual element. Consistency would demand that such a sys-
tem be mechanistic and purely materialistic but here, perhaps, 
natural piety intervenes and enables the naturalist to cling to 
evolutionary naturalism. 
The Nature and Place of Man 
In this pyramid of tier-like construction man emerges, 
just a stage bene~ththe peak, as a very highly developed organ- I 
ism with a complex nature and a variety of functions, a new level 
of behavior. The distinctive qualities of this level are mind 
and self-conaciousness. 
Kind is the relatively permanent organization of habits 
and tendencies which enables the animal to react as a whole to 
the stimuli and to adjust itself intelligently. Mind is some-
thing which grows and d~veloPs with the organism. 2 
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Consciousness, the second distinctive quality of Uhis new 
level of behavior, is a function of attention, stimuli and assoc-
iations. It is a continually changing stream. The function of 
consciousness is guidance. It presents to the mind a sort of 
~ 
survey when the brain-mind is seeking to adjust itself, or to 
solve a problem. 3 
Thus, according to this view, tn\higher act1vities of 
man, 1ntellection, discriminative choice and aesthetic appreci-
tion are taken to be adequately explained by the complexity and 
high degree of development of the organism. We find no mention 
of faculties or powers as such. The self is a very complex kind 
of reality. It is an organized system of hab1ts, information, 
aims and sentlments. 4 Let this suff1ce for the view of man as he 
is in himself and let us turn our attention to the problem of 
freedom. 
The New Setting of the Problem of Freedom 
The problem of free will receives much the same treatment 
from Sellars that the other problems received. Considerable 
space 1s given to the rejection of other doctrines but little is 
said as to a thorough solution of the problem. The question of 
free will has been oleared up in m~y respeots in the years of 
oontroversy which have raged around it. The setting of the .de-
bate has shifted from the question predest1nation to the present 
problem of the indiv1dual's freedom from nature. This modern 
shift 1n the staae of the question is due, in large part, to an 
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awakening to the impossibility of the naked-soul conceptfon of 
personality and self-hood. We must not think of our wills as 
being free but as ourselves as being free. For what are we? 
concrete persons who are agrowths in nature at the social level. 
Each individual is a distinct growth from the roots of heredity 
and environment. Yet in appealing to these roots we must be 
careful not to deny the fact of our sense of internal choice and 
;" 
valuations. Sellars deprecate. the descrition of self ~ a pro-
I 
~ for simply to say that the self is a product suggests that 
it is a sort of impersonal and mechanical resultant of certain 
forces and that consciousness is an epiphenomenon which contains 
a helpless spectator who teels himself carried on down the stream 
of events. Even to speak of the self as a growth is apt to be 
misleading, for the conscious self is again imagi~ed as a spec-
tator rather than as a participant in the growth. The point to 
realize is that an individual is his personality and that his 
. will, desires and values are intrinSic to that personality. The 
relation of this self, ar personality, to heredity, the individ-
ual's freedom from nature, is evidenced by the rebellion against 
heredity whiCh at times arises within us. For when we rebel 
against heredity, that means that we wish that we had better ca-
pacities and, perhaps, better health. When we rebel against en-
vironment, that means that we wish that we had had better oppor-
tunities. And both wishes are at once natural and futile. We 
are up against what is called our specific fates. Hut such ape-
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cific fate does not rob us of our capacity to select and·'creat. 
along the lines of possibillty which our nature and circumstances 
indlcated. It is I who choose to do this rather than that. I 
choQSe It because I desire It aDd believe it desirable. only ex-
·· .. '7 
ternal constraint can rob me of this active and courageous cholce 
which gives zest to my life. My conscious self is not somethlng 
which merely wl tnesses the play of phys\cal ~d organiC forces as' 
in a deeam. Instead, it is felt as a very centre and focus of 
choice. And I believe that this ,feeling is valid. I want some-
5 thing intensely and do my best to get it. 
Freedom and Responslbilltl 
In studying the questions of freedom and responsibility we 
must be careful, Sellars says, forst to free them from their theo 
logical setting. A soul was thought ot as a naked reality ha.lng 
an innate power of dec~s10n, or faculty of Will, and g1fted wl~ 
the knowledge of right and wrong. Because of these gifts, It was 
responsible. If 1 t freely" that is, w1 thout compulsion trom 
wlthout, chose what was wrong it committed a sin and must exspect I 
to be punished by 1ts creator. But such a solution is too abstrac 
and artific1al. For,once more, what Is'the will; what is the 
nature ot a moral judgment? Is there any assured knowledge ot 
right and wrong as comnands ot a sovereign master? These are the 
questions which Sellars puts to this "schematic and legaliatic" 
view. The answers which he himself gives to these questions w1ll 
throw some light on his doctrine ot human freedom. 
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The reply to the first question is that the will ~s a 
function of a developing complex of instinct and experience. 6 
The second question is treated at length in the discussion 
of the nature of a moral situation. A moral situation is one in 
;7 
which matters of importance as regards ourselves and others are 
up for decision. As a rule, a moral question does not arise over 
mere technical questions of the best means, from the standpoint 
• 
of intelligence and efficiency, to accomplish a desired end, but, 
is rather concerned about the human effects and relations of 
those means and ends. The individual is confronted with a situ-
ation in which the choice whiCh might be made has good effects 
and bad, reasons for making it and not making it. It is up to 
the individual to think the situation through and evaluate the 
possible acts which he might posit in this situation. Unlike a 
purely intellectual judgment, the moral judgment is directly con-
--
nected with choice and possible action. In making a choice, what 
are called ',self-assertive' or 'determining' tendencies are at 
work. And these tendencies are a part of the self which, how-
ever, is larger and more inclusive than they, taken separately. 
At certain times some tendencies are more powerful in us than at 
others. We may be ambitious at one time and inclined to leisure 
and pleasure at another, sensitive to the presence of people of 
the other sex o~ ror a time distinctly ascetic. But, at any mo-
ment of choice, the self is a fairly dynamic and selective centre 
of being. 
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Sellars' meaning in ~wove is further clarified r.n a 
statement he makes concerning ~e place and effect of delibera 
ation of choice. If we could knOIY exactly the si tuation confron-
ting an individual, that is, hlsvaJ.uations, desires, his cour-
.c"', 
age, we could foretell hi s conduct. Or at least we could predict 
he general line of it. For these psychic dispositions are the 
actual data of his own decision; and as soop as these became 
7 ' 
stable in deliberation, the choice would be fixed. The relative 
or.ce of these assertive and determining tendencies, then, to-
ether with the peculiar disposition which happens to be upon the 
individual at the time are the determinants of choice. 
Sense of ~land Responsibilitl 
This question ot moralludgment necess itates the study of 
the sense of du ty and 'ought' together with the question of re-
sponsibility. This. organized, integrated, more or less social-
ized self - while always moreorless fluid - has a momentum and 
implications which our intel11~enee shows us is opposed to de-
sires which spring up now and tben. The sense of 'ought not' is 
the feeling which accompanies this conflict in which the organ-
ized self senses its incompat1b1l1 ty wi th a desire. This sense 
of ought is the basis ot the lIloral categories which are inevi-
table, Sellars says, to such a real self with choice and valu-
ation intrins1e to its very nature. Here, then, we have his ana-
lysis of the sense of duty. 
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Now let us apply this analysis to the question o~' respon-
sibi~ity. A person is held to be responsible if he has the capa-
cities and is controlled by the motives which are characteristio 
of society. It means that he is a oertain kind of person, one 
;7 fi t to be a memeber of society, one who"appreoitLtes human re-
lations. And suCh a person is one who is regarded as (1) oon-
trolled by sooial sanctions such as public opinion and fear of 
.. 
punishment, and (2) has moral insight and makes personal ohoioes 
in accordanoe with the welfare of himself and others. only suCh 
a person should be aocredited as a genuine member of society.8 
If his actions confliot wi th the judgment ot sooiety he will be 
punished. According to what Sellar. maintains, then, responsi-
b11ity simply means that the 1ndividual has been born with self-
asserting and determining tendencies which move him to aot 1n ac-
cord w1th the laws and customs ot society or at least are amen-
able to correction and adaptable to change when they are found to 
be v101ating the laws of soc1ety. Sellars concedes a personal 
corrective power; but as to its ult1mate source in the 1ndiv1dual 
he says nothing. 
Fate or Freedom 
In the same way does Sellars treat human behavior in the 
vexing question ot fate and its bearing on the problem ot human 
freedom. He proposes the tollowing objection whiCh is trequently 
p~t to the professor by the student. 
"It I am a product ot my heredity and environment, 
how can I be held responsible for my actions?" 
His answer, again and yet again, is that the point to rea~~ze is 
that an individual is his personality and that his will, desires 
and val ues are intinsic to that personality. 
"Why cannot I be held free? Take me at any moment 
and I am free in so far as I can carry out my plans. 
And I am responsible for my actions if the;y .. are my 
actions and chosen by me. In ~act, that, as we have 
tried to Show, is all that responsibility means." 8. 
But just what part does the will play in all of this? Assertions 
are made but no explanations are given • 
.. 
Sellars answers the third question by saying that we come 
to a knowledge of right and wrong through experience in which we 
gradually come to evaluate things for ourselves and become ac-
quainted with the demands and prohibitions of society. This is 
all the product of evolution. Laws come from within nature and 
are not imposed upon it from without. 
Summary 
Thus does Sellars present his views on human freedom. 
Spiritual powers are rejected, on the one hand as being unneces-
sary and, on the other, as being mere fictions introduced to 
satisfy the theological bias of certain philosophers. Further-
mare, matter,considered as the sole primary element in the pro-
cess of emergent evolution, is regarded as the ultimate squrce, 
not only of all beings, but of their proper activltie. as well. 
The doctrine which follows upon such presuppcs itions appears to 
be an effort to explain human freedom without a free human agent. 
For the source of all activity such as choice and power of con-
trol is said to be the highly developed bit of protoplasm known 
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as man. All that is said could, with but a few exceptiotis, be 
said of the brute beast. For the freedom spoken of is nothing 
more than spontaneity and the possibIlity of variety in action. 
Trends and impulses are supplied in the place of free will with 
~ 
the result that responsibility is made impossible. It must be 
said that there is no real internal freedom of the will in this 
doctrine, and the best that can be said.for it is that it is a 
very weak form of psychological determinism. 
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CHAPTER V .' 
SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF' FREE WILL· 
In studying the doctrine of free will presented by Schol-
astic Philosophers we shall proceed in» manner somewhat differ-
ent from that of the authors we have just seen. OUr exposition, 
in this case, will begin with a definition of the te~ with a 
view to determining at the very beginnirlg just what we are talk-
ing about; with a view to understanding thoroughly the explana-
tions and arguments proposed. Freedom in general is the immunity 
of an genD from some restraining influence. And of this there 
are three kinds, freedom from external coaction, freedan from ne-
cessity and freedom from obligation. Freedom from external co-
action, or freedom of spontaneous action as it is also called, 
means that the action of the agent is not the result of external 
phYllical force and that the natural movment of the agent is not'" 
impede by an opposing physical agency. Thus the lion in the 
jungle is free to roam where he chooses while the caged lion is 
deprived, to a grea.t extent, of such freed:> m. Freedom of inde-
pendence or freedom from obligation, is the immunity of an agent 
from the moral obligation imp~ed by a lawtul suprerior. In the 
strictest sense of the word this freedom is found on1y in God, 
the source of all lawful authority. In a wider sense this free-
dom is enjoyed by men in those acts which are neither commanded 
nor forbidden-by human or divine law. In such acts man is free 
and independent. 
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Analysis ot Freedom ot Ohoice 
.' 
Freedomot choice, treedom in the strictest sense ot the 
term, is the central subject ot our controversy. This freedom 
not only involves the immunity of an ag9nt from external coac-
tion, but the absence of that necessity which governs the activ-
ity of all material beings, whether they be inorganic matter, 
living organisms, or even sensitive beidgs as such. All these 
beings are governed in their operations by necessity, that is, 
lett to themselves, they must act as they do and cannot act 
otherwise. The work of the bird in building its nest and the 
work of the bee in its hive is governed by necessity as is the 
ebb and flow of the tide. Without this necessity the natural 
sciences would lack their basic principle, that is, unifDrmity 
of nature. The necessity, then, which governs these agents ; 
arises from within their nature. • 
The sensitive appetite of both brute and man, guided as it 
is by mere sense knowledge, is restricted to the sphere ot sen-
sible and material good. This limited range is the result of the I 
nature of the sensitive faculties. These powers can know and act 
only upon the concrete individual objects perceived by means of 
sensible qualities. But the rational appetite or will, guided 
by the intellect, is not so limited and can extend to things of 
a higher and the highest order. Because of the higher nature of 
these faculties they are not restricted to the sphere of sensible 
objects but can know and act upon immaterial things, abstpact 
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concepts, the moral good, the heroic and the sublime. C~se­
quently there is only one limitation set to the activity of man's 
will; it can only strive after what is good. Man never has a mo-
tiveless· volition and everything he chooses has something good in 
it for him, albeit in some instances oul of proportion to the 
evil accompanying it. The range, then, of man's rational stri-. 
ving is as wide as the range of the transcendental note 'good' • 
.. 
A definition of freedom of choice as stated by Gruender is 
.that endONment in virtue of which an agent, when 
all the conditions requisite fer the performance 
of an action are given, can perform the action or 
abstain from it, can pertorm this action or that' 1 
This is nothing but a concise expression of what we know from our 
own experience, that our will possesses personal dominion over 
itself in so far as it can actively determine its own line of 
action. And this dominion is known as active indifference. 
Freedom of the Other Faculties 
Here it will be well to clear up some possible misunder-
standings. There is only one human faculty far which freedom of 
choice is claimed, namely the rational appetite or will. All 
other faculties of man, cognitive and appetitive, are not free. 
In the presence of their proper objects and all the conditions 
requ1si te for the act they function necessarily unle.ss the will 
intervenes to redirect their activity. Thus the freedom and con-
trol which the other powers seem to have is not their own, but 'is 
their response to the power ot the will which controls them. 
'A thing is said to move in two waysJ First, as 
an end; for instance, when we say that the end 
moves the agent. In this way ~he intellect moves 
the will, because the good understood is the ob- .' 
ject of the will, and moves it as an end. Second-
ly, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what 
alters moves what is altered, and what impels 
moves what is impelled. In this way the w111 
moves the intellect, and all the powers of the 
soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudin-
ibus). The reason is, because ~erever we have 
order among a number of ac~ive powers, that 
power whiCh regards the universal end moves the 
pewers which regard particular ends ••••••• 
Now the object of the will is good and the end' 
in general, and each poweria directed to some 
suitable good proper to it, as sIght. 1s direc-
ted to the perception of color, and the intel-
lect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the 
will as an agent move. all the powers of the 
soul to the1r respective acts, except the natur-
al powers of the vegetative part, wh1Ch are not 
subject to our will." 2 
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The control at this h1gher faculty or appetite in man is 
made manifest by the consciousness of struggle which we experi-
ence at times, when for reasons apprehended by our intellect we 
oppose the promptings of our lower appetency. st. Paul g1ves 
classical expression to this struggle when he says, 
'aut I see another law in my members, fighting 
against the law of my mind, and captivating me in 
the law of sin, that is in my members. Unhappy 
man that I am who shall deliver me from the body 
of thia death?" 
Oond1tions for Free Ohoice 
Another point that must be cleared up here is the extent 
of this freedom of the will. Not every act of the wUl is 
claimed to be free. The claim for freedom is this. When all the 
conditions for a free volition are given, our will is endowed 
with the power to elicit the act or abstain from it, to choose 
among various objects intellectually apprehended as good. The 
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first of these conditions for free choice is the state o~ con-
sciousness or attention. That is, we must be aware of what we 
are doing. Thus when we are asleep or half asleep or in a state 
of drowsiness there is not that awareness of the act requisite 
~ 
for a fully free choice. In the same way when.we are distracted 
or engrossed in thought we are not fully conscious of our exter-
nal actions and therefore cannot be 8ai~ to have the same freedom 
that we have when we give those acts our full attention.. Conse-
quently, when we become aware of What we are doing is such a 
state we frequently repudiate the act. This immediate repudiatim 
shows that we did not del1berately choose the first course of 
action, that we did not have full knowledge of what we were dOing 
and therefore were not free. 
The second and more important condition far free choice is 
1ntellectual deliberation, that is, weighing the motives intel-
• 
lectually apprehended. Every free volition must be preeeded by a 
judgment of the comparative goodness of the various objects of 
choice. Such a judgment is known as the objectively indifferent 
judgment. 
Consideration of the Motives 
An objectively indifferent judgment is one in which the 
reasons f~ and against a definite line of action are proposed 
and recognized. In such a judgment the object is propesed as de-
sirable on the one hand and not necessary on the other. There 
are really two judgments invoved in it. The one proposes the 
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motives for striving for the object, while the other pr~oses the 
motives for rejecting the object which has been intellectually 
apprehended as good. In treating of this matter we must ever 
keep in mind that every judgment of ours in regard to finite good 
is always, at least virtually and implicitly, dual in charaoter, 
expressing motives for and against its choice. No finite good 
brings unmixed bliss to me; every finite good has some evil con-
.. 
nected with it, be it ever so little. Virtue is attractive, but 
I am also aware of the difficulty of self-control and the demands 
of saorifice. Illicit pleasures are very attractive, but there 
is also the knowledge of the wages of sin. These of course are 
the extremes but every deliberate consideration of cboice will 
find ita place somewhere between the two. Thus it is that man, 
by means of his intellect, is able to study every aspect of a 
situation and can find in it reasons for and against a certain 
course of action. It is, then, in this intellectual faculty with 
its power of weighing the relative merits and demerits of the ob-
ject proposed that we find the root of freedom. 3 
Active Indifference 
The next question whiCh presents itself for consideration 
is that of active indifference. Indifference is oppa:. ed to de-
termination; active is opposed to passive. Indifference when 
predicated of the will may denote that dispostion which is called 
,pathy and is that property in virtue of which the faculty is not 
determined to strive after a certain object in particular. It 
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might be said here that other faculties are thought to b~' endowed 
with this power since they are not determined to one line of ac-
tion. But the peculiar indifference of the will is expressed and 
qualified by the term active. The will is actively indifferent 
. ., 
while all the other faculties are ~ssively indifferent. The 
other faculties are determined to a particular line of action by 
a cause from without. The peculiar sti~lus which acts upon the 
senses at any moment determined the line of action of the senses. 
But the free will determines itself. \Vhen various conflicting 
otives solicit the will in various directions the will itself 
can determine its own attitude towards the motives intellectually 
apprehended. It can choose or refuse to accept pleasure, it can 
choose or refuse to do its duty, whatever the circumstances of 
the case W opaae. The determination, then, to a particular line 
of action originates in the will and hence its indiffereneeis 
called active. 
In all that has been said so far the one object was to 
show what was meant by free will. But what are the arguments 
that can be brought forward for the doctrine of free will? There 
are three arguments which we shall now consider. The first is an 
argument from our own experience in conscious deliberate acts. 
The second is based on the need of free will for true morali t;y. 
The third is based on the need of free will as a necessary com-
plement to man's nature. 
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Argument from Consciousness 
From introspection I know for a fact that very often it is 
in my power to choose among various actions which I have motives 
to perform. An example of an action toqthe performance of which 
we attatch very little importance will serve as an example. 
After having given, for instance, a few hours to study in 
~ 
my room, I realize it would be good and desirable to interrupt my 
work for a few moments. I feel sure I shall feel better disposed 
£or work again after a few moments' rest. On the other hand, I 
realize that this interruption of work is by no means necessary 
for me, at least not at this precise moment. I may easily put 
off the interruption for a while longer. ~l1rthermore, I realize 
that this change, though desirable even at this moment, is not 
only not necessary, but in a way very undesirable. I am just 
ready to jot down an argument which at least in its present fornt 
may escape me if I divert my mind by an interruption. As a mat-
ter of fact, all motives considered, I come to the conclusion 
that it is preferable to postpone the interruption. Here are 
clearly all the prerequisites for free choice. The comparative 
desirability of two courses of action 1s clearly before me and I 
am quIte conscious of their desirability and pay attention to it. 
ile as a matter of fact the stronger of the two motives was 
followed, it cannot be sa1d that this motive determined the 
choice. On the grounds of the same consideration I could have 
also interrupted my study_ In that act and all such acts of the 
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~ree will it is impossible to predict with absolute certainty 
jus t what is going to be Cb ne in given circumstances. In such 
acts there is an element strictly incalculable, namely, the free 
choice of the will. 
;~ Further evidence for the existence and function of free 
~ill can be found in the conduct of any Ie rson about to make a 
great change in life or about to enter on an important enterprise • 
.. 
In such matters people do not as a rule act impulsively but rath~ 
give the subject much thought and consult others on it. Now it 
would be impossible for them to treat the matter in this way if 
they were not endowed with freedom. If they were always deter-
~ined by the conditions around them and were not free, how could 
they put off the decision until after due deliberation? Secondly, 
what use would there be in studying the situation if eventually 
the choice did not lie with the individual but must cane as the 
necessary result of attendant circumstances? Evidently, then, 
there is some power of determination within the individlal that 
is conditioned and influenced by motives but in no way determined 
by them. 
Then, too, such a thing as self-reproach and kindred feel-
ings would be absurd except we be free. We may be sorry for 
some thing which we could not help doing but we in no way reproach 
ou.selves for it. The difference in the two feelings is simply 
that in the one we know that we were free and could have done 
otherWise while in the other we dislike the result of the act but 
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feel that there was nothing to be done about it. In the 4 same way 
we are sometimes disturbed by strong emotions and desires which 
create a great disturbance within us abut at the same time we are 
consoious of the fact that we need not oonsent to these feelings, 
that we must not makd them our own by oonsenting to them. ,And 
this is only possible 1n the event that we are possessed of a 
power in virtue of which we are able to withhold our assent and 
.. 
oombat these feelings. That is to say, the only adequate explan-
ation for these feelings and the only suffioient reason far their 
existenoe is the presenoe within us of a power whloh:i. not dete 
mined by these feelings but is free to oonsent to them or oombat 
them. And that power, we say, is free will. Indeed, our own ex- , 
perience gives us no end of evidenoe for the existenoe of freedom 
of the will. 
Argument from Morali tl 
The second argument for the freedom of will is the argu-
ment from morality. One o'f the most important. characteristios of 
man's superiority over the brute 1s his morality. But if he has 
not the power of self-determination or of tree will as we have 
defined it then it is useless to talk of his morality. And that 
is to be the burden of the subsequent exposition. 
Obligation is not a mere oonvent1onality, not a mere name, 
but a reality. Man is really and truly ob11ged in conscience to 
perform certain aotions and to avoid others. But this obligat10n 
supp08es that man 1s tree. Therefore, man is free. Everyone 
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will admit that debtors must pay their bills, that the p4rties 
entering on a bilateral contract must perform their parts ot the 
agreement, that children should honor and respect their parents, 
and that many other obligations arise from human relationships. 
No matter how men may try to explain away obligations, they could 
not reasonalby maintain that all such obligations are simply the 
fictions of old-tashioned medieval mor~ists, not true tor every 
age. But, as we said above, all this supposes that man is free. 
It man is not tree, he is necessitated in his actions, they are 
beyond his control. But it he be necessitated, of what good is 
it to preach to him of obligation and responsibility? You might 
just as well preach to a machine. And it is equally ineffective 
to attempt to hold the validity of obligation in the face of psy-
chological determinism as it is to hold it in the face of strict 
mechanical determinism. For in both cases the control required 
for morality and obligation 1s lacking. 4 
The Greater Seeming Good 
The determinists attempt to hold the validity of obligatio 
and morality along with their doctrine by saying that the will 
always follows the greater seeming good. But in saying this 'they 
prove nothing against free will. The "greater seeming good" may 
stand for anyone of the following; the more pleasurable; the more 
rational gaod; what is mo~e in keeping with our habitual inclin-
ation; what is more in accord with our present actual inclination 
( and this latter embraces two possibilities ); what is more in 
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accord with our present actual indeliberate inclination; ~hat is 
more in accord with our present actual deliberate inclination. 
Now in all meanings of the term except the last, the statement of 
the will's submission to the "greater seeming good" is false be-
cause it is contradicted by experience. Experience proves that 
all men are not epicurians; that all men are not saints; that 
many a sinner has reformed and many a hero haa fallen; that men 
... 
~ight Valiantly and successfully against temptatio~ But now let 
IUs consider the last meaning of the term: "Men always act in ac,-
~ord with their actual deliberate inclination". This 1s true and 
~lways will be true. It simply means that men always actually 
~ncline towards that towards which they actually incline. And 
~hat is the same as say1ng that that mot1ve prevails which the 
~ill makes to prevail. 
Now the greatest fault in the statement we are considering 
is its un1versa11ty. It 1s true that we sometimes, perhaps ofte~ 
follow the greater seeming good in the sense that we follow the 
line of least resistance, whatever that happens to be. However, 
~he point to be stressed here is that even While following the 
~reater attraction we frequently realize most clearly that we do 
~o as a resu1t of our own free choice, fully aware that we can 
phange our resulution without any change in thepperception of the 
~reater seeming good. Furthermore, if we did not have the power 
of free choice we should be unable to act at all in those instan-
~es where the motives for and against an act, or the motives for 
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an7 one of a number of possible acts were all equally s~ong. 
or in suCh an instance there would be no greater seeming good. 
owever, experience teaches us that this is not the case and that 
e can and do act in such circumstances. The theory of the 
"greater seeming good" is only true when understood as the prac-
tical judgment which precedes the execution of the choice but 
hich is made consequent upon the choice of the will. 5 
... 
Effect of Environment on Action 
Another favorite claim of the determinist is that men are 
the result of their environment. Again, the fault lies in making 
he statement universal in reference to men's actions. Experience 
be called upon again to show that this statement is false. 
istory gives us any number of instances of good men coming from 
a bad environment and bad men coming from a good environment. At 
the same time it is true that our environment does have some in-
fluence on us. But our environment only influences us, it does 
not determine' us. It is also true that there are individuals who 
are strongly influenced by their environment, who would be good 
if good influences were brought to bear upon them and bad if bad 
unfluences were brought to bear upon them. But this is not due 
to the fact that they are not free but rather to the fact that, 
not Choosing to exercise the freedom they have, they prefer to 
act in accord with the people with whom they find themselves. 
The present crisis in Spain shows clearly that more than environ-
ment enters into the determination of men's actions. In the same 
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location there are to be found Royalists, SocialistB and~abid 
~archists. APparently the environment was not the determining 
element of the choice of the individual members of these groups. 
Furthermore, it is quite possible that some individuals had left 
<7 
one party and taken up the cause of one of the others without any 
noticeable change in the environment. It is clear, then, that 
the environment does little more than irfluence the individual by 
presenting motives for and against possible courses of action. 
And it is the individual, whether in a favorable or unfaVorable 
enVironment, that u1itmately determines his own course of action. 
In this way alone can we account for the variety of political 
parties, not only in Spain, but in practically every country in 
the world. Finally, the same freedom of choice which individuals 
enjoy in choosing their political affiliations they likewise en-
joy in every deliberate action and can therefore be held respon-
" ... 
sible for it. 
Necessary Complement of Man's Nature 
Now let us proceed to the third and last proof of free 
will which is based on the need of free will as the necessary 
complement of man's nature. OWing to his rational nature, man is 
capable of objectively indifferent judgments, that is, of judg-
ents which exhibit motives both for striving after and for re-
jecting any particular line of action. But these objectively in-
different judgments are to no purpose unless man's rational ap-
petency or will is actively indifferent, that is, unless his will 
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is free. Therefore, man's will is free. The object of une will, 
as was said above, is the good apprehended by the intellect. In 
so far as an object is presented to the will as good it is desir-
able, but 1n so far as 1 t is presented as evil 1t. is undesirable • 
No • 7 there is only one object that moves whe will necessarily and 
that is the object which is represented as good or desirable in 
every respect. There is only one object which fulfills tOls re-
• • 
quis1te and that is the Divine Essence, the Summum Bonum. And it 
must be noted, that in this life, due to imperfect knowledge, 
concupiscence and the interference of his lower nature, man is 
runable to apprehend God as the SUmmum Bonum. So we can say that 
in every instance of deliberation over choice there are motives 
for acting and not acting. Similarly, in the case of a desired 
end man sees that there are various ways of attaining it; the 
~eans to the end is not restricted to one course of action. Now 
all of this would be futile in the event that man was not able to 
rule his actions in the light of this knowledge but must follow 
the course of action which his nature and circumstances determin~ 
Not on11 would this knowledge be futile but also a source of mis-
ery instead of a source of happiness. With this knowledge man 
can determine his actions and use the means which will insure his 
attainment of the end desired. But if he be not free he must 
follow, not what he knows to be the surest and best courae but 
that course which the circumstances in the case determine. He 
would not be master of his fate, but, rather, the vi.tim of his 
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fate. Virtue and vice both in himself and others would "imply be 
the peculiar fate of the individual, a fate whiCh cannot be 
avoided or overcome. Ideals would count for nothing and noble de-
~ires would be meaningless tor they would be powerless in moving 
'" the individual to action. Under such conditions man would be not 
the happiest of creatures but the most miserable. Evidently, a 
~ature endowed with a rational soul but.not freedom of choice is 
a caricature. In conclusion let us consider st. Thomas' teleo-
logical argument for the freedom of the will. 
"Man has tree will; otherwise counsels, exhortations, 
commands, prohibitions, rewards and punishment would 
be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must 
observe that some things act wothout judgment; as a 
stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things 
which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, 
but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the 
sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be 
shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, 
because it judges, not from reason, but from natur-
al instinct. And the same thing is to be said of 
any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from 
judgment, because by his apprehensive power he 
judges that something should be avoided or sought. 
But beoause this judgment, in the case of some 
particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but 
from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore 
he acts from free judgment and retains the power 
of being inclined to various things •. For reason in 
contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as 
we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical argu-
ments. Now particular operations are contingent, 
and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason 
may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate 
to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it neoes-
sary that man have a free will. 6 
Having completed our exposition of the traditional Schol-
astic doctrine of human freedom we may now turn our attention to 
an analysis of the other doctrines treated in this thesis in the 
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light c£ what we have just seen. 
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CHAPTER VI . ' 
CRITICISM OF EVOLUTIONARY VIEWS 
The philosophy of Evolution, at least in the instances 
here being sbudied, denies the exlsten~~ of a rational principle, 
the soul, distinct from and essentially superior to matter. Des-
pite the strong evidence of science to the contrary, despite the 
incompatibility of identifying sp1rituat and material functions, 
our worthy opponents insist upon saying that life, ( and even 
more than that, intellection ) have matter as their ultimate 
source. The consequences of such a tenet are evidently false. l 
The authors agree that the peculiar control found in man 
is due to his intellectual p~ler of abstraction and relation; in 
other words, to man's ability to conceive ends as ends and tne 
relation of means to end. At the same time they are unaware of 
what was pointed out above, that without free will this intelle~ 
tual power is useless and ~urtful. In each instance the intel-
lect is regarded as determining the will. The will, on the evi-
dence of the mind, comes to know the strongest motive and is then I 
moved to act upon this motive. The freedom of such an act lies 
in the fact that the agent is not moved by a physical force de-
termining it in 1ts act from without. The individual determines 
the acts but in accord with that which has the strongest appeal 
at the moment. But this is no more that the freedom of spontane-
ity which even tne animal has when not confined. The indifferenc 
lies in the fact that the individual is not determined to act the 
os. .. 
same way in every instance. But since this indifference l.s due 
fact that the subjective state varies from time to time, 
d to this fact alone, it is not active but only passive indif-
... 
Effec~ of Knowledge on Will 
Engels makes clear knowledge the determinant of the will; 
• knowledge is also the source of freedom; in ignorance the 
ill must make an arbitrary choice and is not free. This is a 
isconcept1on of freedom. Knowledge enables the will to act fre&-
y by reason of the fact that it presents many courses of action 
d the reasons for and against each action. But the power' of 
ree choice is in the will itself and nat in knowledge. Ignor-
nee, partioularly if it is inculpable, oan make certain unfor-
een and unintended effects of a free action involuntary.2 Know-
edge does influence freedom but does not control or overwhe~ • 
its choice. Engels here confuses the condition of the 
choice with the cause of the choice. He neglects the cause en-
tirely and make. the condition the cause. Furthermore, Engels in I 
ractice is not consisten with his theory. In theory he main-
ains that the will is not free. But in his gospel of revolution 
e implies and internal power that is free to initiate and carry 
through to completion the various processes that will bring about 
the economio emanCipation of the hUman race. Here it is well to 
ote that Engels, as well as every other communist, dare not ad-
it the freedan of the will. For to do that would be an admis-
sion that men can freely determine economic conditions ~ would 
thus destroy the inevitability of a world revolution founded on 
universal determinism. To admit free will would also be an admis 
sion of the fact that men can combat the evil and hostile ele-
~ents of their environment, as the Catholics actually' do in Mexi-
co today. In brief, to admit the existence of free will is to 
destroy the very foundations of Communism. Therefore, despite 
• 
the fact that it contradicts What we know to be true, it must be 
maintained that there is no 'suCh thing as human freedom based on 
man's power of free choice. 
Ward and Sellars make the intellect a motive inasmuch as 
they consider it as one phase of the moving self. Just as emo-
tions and desires are the moving of the self towards or away from 
an object, so intellection is a moving of the self towards or 
away from an object. And just as the stronger emotion prevails 
so the greater knowledge, that is, of reasons for or against the 
choice, together with their emotional concomitants, prevails. In-
tellection, then, becomes just another determining element in an 
act which the authors call free but which we would call impulsiv~ 
And impulsive it is, because feeling and impulse, not intellec-
tual knowledge together with the choice of the will, determine 
the act. 
The Nature or a Faculty 
The authars take the above view of knowledge because they 
insist on regarding man as a unit and all his acts as the work-
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ings or this unit. Thus they repudiate the faculty expldnation 
because it represents man as being made up, let us say, of a num-
ber of little machines each having its proper function and acting 
independently of the others. Mental faculties, as we explain 
07 
them, are imagined by the adversariea as peculiar organizations 
1n the soul similar to the physical organs in the body; and they 
fail to regard the faculties, and the w\ll in particular, as 
peculiar modes of activity abiding permanently in the soul. 3 They 
wish to explain faculties as nothing more than the response of 
the individual to various ,stimuli, and to account for the power 
to make these responses by the adaptability of the nature of the 
individual only. They maintain that we can only classify the 
different acts and cannot conclude from them to any definite dis-
position in the soul as their source. There are only functions 
which man in his development by trial and error has learned to 
perform; and through the frequent repetition of these functions 
men have achieved a certain facility in their performance. As 
this facility of performance increased, men became more disposed 
to perform these acts when the occasion called for them. Choice, 
then, becomes nothing more than a peculiar response of the indi-
vidual's whole nature to a situation. For that reason they main-
tain that it is incorrect to say that the will chooses, while, 
as a matter of fact, it is the man who chooses. 
The explanation just treated above makes man a mere spec-
tator of the actions which he performs. He has a part in them it 
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is true but his part consists in following the direction .,pointed 
out by the determining factors of the moment. Accordingly, the 
simple act of choice presents in the psychic realm a phenomenon 
very much like that of the parallelogram of forces in the physica 
..... " 
realm. Forces conflicting with one another are at work and the 
stronger force prevails. When the individual chooses he is moved 
to make the choice by the stronger motive.' But as we have seen 
• 
above, the stronger force, a temptation. for example, does not 
always prevail but ,is combated by another force which is influ-
enced but not determined by it. Furthermore, the opposition set 
p against the temptation is prompted by a physically and psychi-
oally weaker element, that is, knowledge. The will, knOwing that 
the temptation is bad, opposes it. Furthermore, in confliot we 
are aware, not of two forces acting within us and pulling us in 
different directions, but rather of a force within us whih we ac-
tively combat of our own accord. The struggle is internal, but 
the self takes one side of it. 
The Basis of Morality and Responsibility 
The explanation of the determinists given above, besides 
contradioting what we know from our own experience, destroys the 
very foundation of morality and responsibility. In these latter 
the important element is the knowledge of right and wrong togeth-
er with the power to act with the guidance of this knowledge 
against strong opposing forces. But this knowledge in itself is 
not a force but a mere presentation of facts and influences the 
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will by reason of tne fact that it presents desirable ob!ects to 
it. Emotions and desires are the spontaneous response of the in-
dividual to desirable 06jects. It is true that there are associ-
ated with knowledge definite emotions. Through this association 
knowledge has a fruther influence on the will. But in the deter-
minists' explanation it would be not the knowledge but the con-
comitant emotions which would point out the course which the will 
;. 
should follow. Furthermore, unless the will was endowed with the 
power of choosing its own course of action it would be forced to 
follow the dictates of the emotions and desires which were associ-
~ith the knowledge. In th1s view the elements of determination 
I'become, first, the spontaneous emotions or reactions of the indi-
vidual accompanying the perception of the good, and second, the 
emotions that accompany the knowledge of the object, that know-
ledge which the individual attains through reflection and a con-
sideration of the object. In suCh a situation the determining 
element will be the stronger emotion. And unless there is a pow-
er which is capable of acting against this emotion when ·it is 
known to represent the less desirable aspect of the object, as 
far example in sin, the individual must follow it. In such a 
situation the individual, knowing what is right, is unable to 
follow this knowledge because the stronger forces of his being 
are against it. Fir thermore, he could only do what he knows to 
be right when his emotions and desires are in accord with his 
knowledge or when there is aS80ciated with this knowledge an 
~O. 
emotional force strong enough to overcome the emotional ~orces 
opposed to this knowledge. Thus man would choose what he does 
because he must choose it. Consequently, conformity to the moral 
law would be beyond his own power. And for the same reason he 
47 
could not be held responsible for what he did because he simply 
~ad to do it. 
Experience, however, gives us ev\denCe that the actual 
situation is diffel'ent from that presented by the determinists •. 
when,for instance, while performing an action or harboring a bad 
thought indeliberately we immediately stop the action or dispell 
the thought on becoming aware of what we are doing. In one in-
~tance we follow the spontaneous trend of the mind and impulse, 
~ut in the other we actively modify both the thought and the 
action. We could not do this if we did not have freedom of will. 
Such events certainly show that we have direct control over our 
actions and that in deliberate acts there is a force at work that 
is independent of the other powers of our being. 
In the light of determinism it would be cruel to hold an 
individual to the observanc.e of the moral law and punish him if 
~e did not observe it. Each individual, if determinism would be 
consistent, would know no law nor be capable of observing any law 
save the law of his own peculiar character. Society could not 
~ope to correct recalcitrant individuals and could only protect 
itself by segregating them and thus making it impossible for them 
to harm SOCiety. It is very difficult to see just how education 
could effect a Change in criminals. PuShing determinism·to its 
logical conclusion we see that society would not be made up of 
individuals subject to law but-of individuals subject to no law •. 
Determinism and Radical Conversions 
47 
In the same way the determinists are at a loss to explain 
the fact of sudden and radical conversions either from a bad life 
to a good life or vice versa. The firs\ gives compelling evi-
dence of a power capable of acting against the habits and incli-
nations of the past, which, they all agree, are important ele-
ments in the making of character. For in such a conversion the 
individual turns, not only against his environment, but also 
against the ingrained habits and dispositions of his whole past· 
life. The second shows that ingrained habits and tendencies 
alone are not strong enough to keep a person on the path of vir-
tue but may break down and give way to ether tendencies in the 
face of a great crisis or temptation. In the light of determin-
ism a saint should be a saint far all time and the sinner a sln-
ner forever. 
It is not to our purpose here to discuss the question of 
the origin and nature of the moral law. We might just note here 
that the authors we have treabed maintain that the moral law de-
velops with the advance of society. As man grows in knowledge of 
imself and the world about him, he comes to see what is helpful 
to him and what is hurtful. On the basis of this knowledge the 
moral law is built up and maintained. This law, however, embrac~ 
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nly the social aspect of man's life. Though it is not ~pressly 
stated, still, we can conclude from what is said that man is only 
ilty of wrong-doing when he performs an act that is harmfUl to 
Personal sin, an offence against God to Whom the. indi-
q 
in complete submission, is neither mentioned nor con-
A man can do what he likes with himself and in his pri-
as long as his actions do not pave an evil effect on 
Of course, were there such a thing as personal sin rec-
the determinist he would be confronted with the same 
ifficulty of responsibility as pointed out above. 
Conclusion 
As a conclusion to this discussion it can with certainty 
e said that the doctrine of determinism in rejecting the freedom 
active indifference destroys morality and responsibility and 
man a brother of the brute. The nobility of the vir' 
as well as the meanness of the evil life is destroyed. 
become, not what he would have himself to be, but 
hat his nature and environment determine him to be. Surely, 
hese are unhappy conclusions. It is well that our own experi-
nce teaches us that they are false. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
Dr. Samuel Johnson has said, 
"All theory is against freedom of the will, 
all practice far it." 
. ' 
The three non-scholastic philosophers ~~ have studied seem to 
74 • 
bear out the truth of Johnson's statement. In theory, each of 
these men attempted to show that the will is not possessed of the 
freedom of active indifference. At the·same time they implied, 
in their applications of theory to practice that there must be 
freedom of will. It is interesting to note the attitude of mind 
which dominated these men in their speculations and brought them 
to conclusions which, no doubt, they would be unwilling to main-
tain if they once realized the fatalism and pessimism that neces-
sarily flows from them. 
Scientific Attitude of PhilOSOPhers 
Each of thewe writers, in d~scussing and refuting the ar-
guments of the philosophy ~ the schoolmen, showa clearly that he 
understands neither the doctrines nor the spirit of this philos-
ophy. Undoubtedly their main objection against this traditional 
philosophy would be that it is not scientific. To set down gen-
eral prinCiples and propositions from which. the particular in-
stance ia explained is, in their narrowly empirical understand-
ing of science, a procedure just the reverse to that of science. 
Evidently they do not realize that the general statement followed 
upon the study of particular instances. At the same time these 
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men are not aware that they themselves are anything but A'cientif'-
ic in their methods and procedure. They fail to sense the defect 
of their own methods and overlook the fact that they may not be 
open-minded in appraising the methods of others. This is a fair 
.. ., 
indictment of their own spirit for from the attitude which each 
has assumed towards the teachings of others, it seems clear that 
they were more ready to repudia te o~er .doctrines than to under-
stand them. This fac~ appears in the frequent misstatements of' 
the doctrines and meaning of terms as presented by scholastic 
philosophers. Having interpreted them in their own way they re-
ject them as untrue and unreasonable. At the same time these men 
accept theories and propase solutions to problems which demand 
more faith than reason, which fitted fancies better than they fi~ 
ted the tacts. To mention only one of these, let us take evolu-
tion. Darwin, the father of the modern development of the idea 
of organic evolution, in proposing this theory did not intend 
that it should be taken as an absolute and demonstrated fact. l It 
was for him just a theory, a purely speculative consideration, 
suggested by the gradations in nature which seemed to proceed one 
from another, and the correspondence of the organs and functions 
of one level with another. But here we have three men who take 
the theory of evoultion as a basic dogma of reality and attempt 
to build settled systems of philosophy upon it. Whatever one 
.ight term such a procedure, it is not scientific thus to turn 
tenuous hypothesi~ into iron-clad dogma. 
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What Science Really Shows 
A clever device used by these men in explaining away dif-
ficulties was to say that science had not progre8sed sufficiently 
as yet to give a complete explanation Qt the problem at hand. 
However, there was no doubt in their minds that the day would 
come when all the necessary facts would be produced and evolution 
together wi th all that follows from it ~ould be demonstrated. U 
fortunately for these men science has not lived up to their ex-
pectations. Rather, science has shOwn that these theories are 
untenable, and the more deeply thefluestions are delved into the 
more evidence of this fact is brought forth. 2 Along with this 
evidence there is coming to men of science today the realization 
that there are many problems which science cannot approach. Sur-
prising to note, the question of free will is one of these, and 
many of the prominent scientists of today are not only realizin! 
but even openly admitting that the question of free will is be-
yond the scope of the test tube. 3 It is however not beyond the 
scope of introspection. And introspection is a true scientific 
method. However, introspection is not to be classed with those 
strictly mechanical methods of the physical sciences, the methods 
referred to by the term .test tube' •. Would the authors, knowing 
the decisions of modern scientists, still insist that a denial of 
free will would be in accord with science? 
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Free Will a Vital Power 
Perhaps we could forgive the determinists if their doc-
trines concerned only theory and did not affect practical life. 
or then they could hold to their the~Jes, and no one would be 
the worse off for the errors. But since free will holds so great 
a place in the life of every individual, the determinist must be 
ealt with severely as an enemy to the tndividual and society. 
It would not, I think, be wrong to say that, after God, the most 
important thing in the individual's life is his power d free 
choice. Endowed with this power, man is the master of his fate. 
and the ruler of his own life. Without this power, he would be-
come a mere puppet that is ever moved about by the forces of na-
ture within himself and about him. With free will man has the 
power to control the powers of his being, it is within his power 
to do good and evil, to make of his life an example of virtue o~ 
an exhibition of vice. Because of this power of free will men 
are held responsible for what they do, and can be trusted to ex-
ercise this power in respecting the persons and rights of others 
and to live according to the dictates of right reason. 
In the same way the power of freely following an object of 
choice enables men to rise above the sordid environment in which 
they sometimes find themselves and follow the guidance of their 
igher nature in the way of virtue. Ideals are efficacious in 
the lives of individuals simply because man is not bound to fol-
low the direction which his innate powers and environment point 
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out. .' 
Everyone acknowledges the fact of free will when he lauds 
the bravery of an individual who has overcome the fear that was 
within him and went undaunted into the dangers that beset him 
~ . ., 
from without. Like witness is given when people look down upon 
the coward who has followed the feelings that took hold of him 
and fled when a dangerous situation confronted him. A still 
greater witness is to be found in any court or law where men are 
called to account for their actions because they are free; where 
they are exonerated if it can be shown that the violation of the 
law was beyond their control. Many other examples could be 
brought forth showing that men have ever regarded their fellow-
men as free beings having the power to control their actions. In 
fact, so strong is the evidence for the existence of free will 
that it is nothing but common sense to admit its existence and 
... 
simply futile to deny it. Even the great human progress which we 
see going on about us constantly manifests the presence of free 
will, for all such progress, scientifiC, economic, individual, 
80cial, must be attributed ultimately to the power of man's free 
will to choose the better pourae. 
The Determinist's Sad World 
On the other hand, a denial of free will begets a philos-
ophy of fatalism and pessimism as a necessary consequence. It 
was a wise student who in consternation asked professor Sellars 
why and how he could be held responsible for his actions if they 
79. 
were the result of his heredity and environment. For tHis stu-
dent had caught the significance of the very point which im-
pressed st. Thomas in his defense of the freedom of the will. 
Both of them saw clearly that it would be strange and useless and 
<7 
unreasonable to urge people OD to the practice of virtue and ex-
hort them to avoid vice if they haa not free wills. And as Dr. 
Johnson maintains, the theory is not s~nsistent with our practi-
cal experience. For words of encouragement and assistance in 
difficult matters would fallon deaf ears if there was not a pow-
er capable of overcoming difficulties and holding the struggler 
to persevere to the end. Ideals would be meaningless and a 
source of misery instead of a spur to higher things if our inher-
ited powers and environment determined our actions for us. 
In brief, life would be worth living only for those who 
were fortunate enough to receive a finer grade of powers when 
heredity came round to distribute them. These individuals could 
look for happiness in a life of goodness and success. But it 
would be a narrowing and bitter form of goodness and success in 
which they could Dot;:nelp their less fortunate brothers whose 
powers did not permit them to do great things but chained them 
irrevocably to the drab and unhappy life of mediocrity, failure, 
and evil. In the first class of individuals we should find the 
paragons of virtue, find them there because heredity pre-ordained 
that they ahould be there. In the second class the sinner should 
find his place and find it easily for heredity had selected and 
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reserved it for him the day he was born. Who could be ~ppy in 
this world if such were the case? Who would want to live is such 
a world? No one who was worthy of the name, 'human being', not 
even a determinist. But that is what he should have to put up 
. ., 
with if what he said were true. 
Shakespeare's lago tells us that 'our bodies are gardens, 
to which our wills are gardeners, and it is in our power to 
• 
beautify these gardens with industry and good works or to let 
them be over-run with weeds and brambles of idleness and evil 
deeds. Philosophers, scientists and litterateurs have in these 
pages said the same thing in less figurative language. All of 
these men seemed to realize that the knowledge of this fact is 
the lite-spring of hope and self-confidence in the face of great 
problems and great crises, and that to believe that we had not 
that great power of free will would rob life of all meaning and 
destroy completely hope and self-confidence. Though he try with 
all his might, the determinist can never explain away free will, 
for his own nature demands this freedom, and in daily life is 
ever manifesting this great human power. 
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